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Abstract 
 
As technologies develop rapidly, digital signing is 
commonly  used  in  eDocument  security.    However, 
unaddressed  issues  exist.    An  eCertificate  system 
represents  the  problem  situation,  and  therefore  is 
being used as case study, in a project called eCert, to 
research  for  the  solution.    This  paper  addresses 
these issues, explores the gap between current tools 
and  the  desired    system,  through  analysis  of  the 
existing services and eCertificate use cases, and the 
identified  requirements,  thereby  presenting  an 
approach  which  solves  the  above  problems.  
Preliminary  results  indicate  that  the 
recommendation from this research meets the design 
requirements,  and  could  form  the  foundation  of 
future study of solving digital signing issues. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
As  digital  technologies  continue  to  develop 
rapidly, these impact on many daily tasks which rely 
on technology.  Many of our paper-based documents 
are  being  gradually  replaced  by  their  electronic 
versions,  such  as  eTickets,  email,  online  banking, 
and  ePortfolios.    These  technologies  are  powerful, 
flexible, and bring huge advantages.  However, when 
come to transfer digital data between three or more 
unknown parties, there exists a major security issue: 
how can the receiver believe that the transfer data is 
from the expected person, and that it has not been 
modified in any way; and how can the sender ensure 
that their data will not be misused.  
Example  1,  An  electronic  version  of 
qualification  certificate  (eCertificate):  An 
eCertificate will be issued to a learner by an exam 
board,  and  then  further  distributed  to  selected 
reviewers by the learner.  While forged certificates 
exist in paper-based certificate systems, this problem 
also exists in the electronic version of certificates as 
digital documents can be easily copied and modified.   
Example 2, Mobile IDs: The traditional method 
of proving your age, vocation, or skills are by using 
all  sorts  of  ID  cards,  such  as  citizen  card,  student 
card,  and  driving  license.    It  would  be  nice  if  we 
could  integrate  all  these  required  proof  documents 
into  our  mobile  phone,  letting  it  become  the  only 
device  that  we  may  need  to  carry  when  we  leave 
home.   However, we are facing security issues, such 
as how can we let the guard of a pub believe that the 
age proving eDocument on the mobile truly belongs 
to you, is issued from the expected authority, and has 
not been modified since?   
The common problems: There are lots of similar 
scenarios between these two cases.  They represent a 
common  situation  that  authentication  of  data  is 
required when transmitting between two or more, but 
not always known, parties. 
They  both  involve  trust  between  three 
stakeholders, the eDocument issuer, the owner and 
the reviewer.  
a.  The reviewer needs to trust that the eDocument 
belongs to the claimed person, is issued from a 
trusted body, and hasn’t been modified since it 
was issued; needs to trust the issuer and the 
verification system being used 
b.  The eDocument owner needs to trust the 
received eDocument as being truly from the 
expected issuer; trust the reviewer not further 
distribute or misuse the information  
c.  The issuer needs to trust the identity information 
provided by the applicant (the owner) before the 
eDocument can be issued; trust the reviewer not 
to perform any unauthorized action while 
opening the channel to the backend database 
during verification process. 
To  satisfy  the  trust,  all  need  to  address  the 
security  requirements:  Confidentiality:  only  the 
specified person should be able to access it; Privacy: 
owner  should  retain  control  over  the  distributed 
eDocument; Integrity: no unauthorized modification 
should  be  allowed;  Authentication:  self-validating, 
can  be  verified;  Identity:  proof  of  ownership,  and 
you are  who you claim to be; Validation: withdrawn 
situation can be handled; Lifetime validation: would 
remain valid even if the issuing authority no longer 
exists; Trustworthiness:  issuer can be tracked  down 
to a trusted authority. 
 
2.  Limitation of digital signing 
 Digital signing is an efficient  way to prove the 
issue of and prevent modification of an eDocument, 
and therefore it is currently used as the eDocument 
security method.  However, it is most suited static 
documents,  but  not  for  documents  with  changing 
states: 
Content validation: a digitally signed document 
can  have  its  modification,  signer,  and  the  signer’s 
CA validated, but not the content of the document. 
This  is  crucial  to  eCertificate  as  this  signed 
document itself is also a certificate, which may have 
a valid period (e.g. first aid certificate), and may be 
revoked in a later stage (e.g. if it is discovered, after 
the  certificate  has  been  issued,  to  have  cheated  in 
exam or to have plagiarized). The problem we are 
dealing with is a (certificate)
2 issue, which involves 
the  issuer’s  public  key  certificate  and  the 
qualification certificate as a whole.  
Auto request of validation: Current PKI doesn’t 
start  the  validation  of  the  public  key  certificates’ 
status automatically.  It will only process if required.  
In the case of eCertificate, this is a critical security 
hole as it may result in a forgery being accepted if 
the key has been compromised.  
This is explained in Figure1.    
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Figure 1. Issues when applying digital signing 
 
3.  Issues when applying digital signing 
 
When  forward  transfer  of  a  digitally  signed 
eDocument after the first stop is required, it comes 
complicated trust and key management issues. 
 
3.1. Digital  signing  with  independently 
distribute approach 
If we use a digitally signed document to replace 
the paper-based document within the existing issue, 
distribution, and verification process path, e.g. from 
institution to learner, then learner to reviewer, this 
raises  service  support  and  privacy  issues.    It  will 
require all the receivers (the eDocument owner and 
all reviewers) to have service support to handle the 
verification process on reception; once the reviewer 
has  access  to  one  document,  he  can  access  any 
documents that are signed in the same way.  This is 
against  the  confidentiality  and  privacy  requirement 
in some situations. 
 
3.2. Digital  signing  with  individual 
institutional approach 
As  digitally  signed  documents  require  service 
support  and  key  management  for  forward 
distribution, an institutional  approach is commonly 
used to avoid these: a) eDocuments will be issued 
and stored in the institution’s system; b) the system 
will  also  provide  management  and  verification 
service; c) eDocument owners can access the system 
to set access control of their own eDocument before 
sending out the links and access keys to the specified 
reviewers; d) the reviewers can access the system to 
view  and  verify  the  eDocuments  through  the 
provided links and access keys 
An  institutional  approach  can  overcome  the 
service support issue as it provides the management 
and verification services within the institution.  It can 
also address the privacy and confidentiality issues by 
setting system access values.  However, other new 
issues then arise: the approach requires huge storage 
as it needs to store all the issued eDocuments for a 
lifetime;  the  support  service  provides  an  active 
channel  to  the  backend  database,  which  could 
increase the risk of attack rapidly; it is heavily reliant 
on  the  issuing  institutions,  lifetime  validation  is  a 
problem  if  the  institution  no  longer  exists;  it  is 
inconvenient  for  the  receivers  to  access  their 
eDocuments when the eDocuments are issued from 
many different institutions.  E.g. a student may need 
to log into many different institutions to access and 
manage his/her eDocuments received throughout the 
study journey.  
 
3.3. Digital  signing  with  linked  institutions 
plus central service approach 
Alternatively,  linked  institutions  with  a  central 
service  approach  may  be  used:  a)  a  central  online 
system  provides  the  management  and  verification 
service for all member institutions; b) all institutions 
issue eDocuments under the same standard, and then 
upload  to  the  central  system;  c)  the  owners  can 
access the online management system to set access 
control of their own eDocument before sending out 
the link and access token to the specified reviewer; 
d)the  reviewer  can  access  the  online  verification 
system through the link and use the access token to 
view, verify, and download the eDocument.  
Compared  with  the  individual  institutional 
approach,  this  approach  addresses  the  lifetime validation issue, and also solves the inconvenience 
problem  as  the  users  only  need  to  access  one 
reference  point  for  all  the  eDocuments.  However, 
this approach requires even bigger storage as it needs 
to store all the issued eDocuments from the joined 
institutions for a lifetime; this also increases the risk 
of  database  attacks  as  a  bigger  database  contains 
more information; what is more, who will host such 
a system? It must be trusted by all institutions as it 
holds  the  information  for  all  of  them.  But,  the 
English government has a track record of losing our 
sensitive information, and in some cases, the whole 
database.  
 
4.  Case study – the eCert project  
 
The  problems  that  we  are  facing  need  answers.  
The eCertificate example requires digital signing for 
non  static  documents  and  forward  transfer  of  the 
document; it represents the typical problem situation, 
therefore, it is used as case study to research for a 
solution.  
 
4.1. Motivation  
The  field  of  eLearning  provides  technological 
developments, such as ePortfolios, which are being 
explored  as  an  improvement  over  paper-based 
portfolios in the job and course application process.  
However,  forged  certificates  exist  due  to  poor 
security  in  ePortfolio  systems.    Therefore,  the 
students’  claimed  achievements  within  ePortfolios 
need  to  be  verified.    Abrami[1]  notes  that  it  is 
difficult  to  authenticate  the  evidence  in  ePortfolio.  
The JISC (Joint Information Systems Committee) is 
funding the project, eCert, to research for a potential 
solution, which is just what our case study about. 
 
4.2. Domain research 
The eFramework has been the backbone to help 
build interoperable tools for eLearning, such as the 
ones for ePortfolios[2, 3].  It has been facilitated by 
choosing  a  Service  Orientated  Architecture 
(SOA)[4].  The Service Orientated Reference Model 
(SORM)[5]  was  conceptualized  to  encapsulate  the 
eFramework  research  process.    The  eP4LL 
(EPortfolios  for  Lifelong  Learning)  project 
developed a reference model for ePortfolios for the 
eFramework[6].  The  RIPPLL  (Regional 
Interoperability Project on Progression for Lifelong 
Learning)  has  tackled  the  authentication  issue 
between institutions it links by using a SSO (Single-
Sign-On)  system,  where  the  identity  of  a  user  is 
supported by their home institution when accessing 
other institutions’ systems[7].  
The  main  body  of  research  into  ePortfolios  has 
been into defining reference models for the domain, 
such  that  these  can  be  developed  into  a  body  of 
interoperable reference implementation services and 
tools.  It is apparent that although the eP4LL models 
define  the  use  cases  for  the  exchange  of  portfolio 
data,  from  an  eCertificate  perspective  they  are 
limited,  as  neither  has  described  explicitly  the 
security issues raised by transmitting data between 
multiple, and not always known, parties; and there 
still is no mechanism to authenticate the veracity of 
the portfolio data transmitted between institutions in 
RIPPLL.  As Peter Rees Jones[6], an eP4LL project 
member, comments on his blog: “Security and Trust: 
the  [ePortfolio]  Reference  Model  sidestepped  this 
key  issue”.  However,  the  SORM  methodology  has 
been identified to investigate eCertificates. 
 
4.3. Existing systems  
There  are  existing  systems  dealing  with  the 
authentication of qualification.  However, they were 
built for specific purposes, and couldn’t address the 
security requirements involved in data transmission 
that we noted above. For example: 
Europass: the European Community provides a 
Europass  Certificate  Supplement  and  a  Diploma 
Supplement[8].  These provide facsimiles of award 
certificates and information about the qualification.  
However,  the  system  clearly  states  that,  “The 
Europass Certificate Supplement is not: a substitute 
for the original certificate;” or “An automatic system 
that guarantees recognition”.  But, this is not good 
enough for the security in real world.   
The  Chinese  Certificate  Information 
Verification  service  [9]:  The  service  will  take 
unique  student  numbers  and  unique  certificate 
numbers  as  input,  and  output  the  specified 
qualification detail along with the student’s personal 
detail, including a photo.  It provides more reliability 
to the viewers as it also verifies the identity of the 
person. But this method doesn’t suit every country, 
e.g. it against the data protection law in UK.  Also, 
this  service  only  verifies  qualification  records,  but 
not eCertificates. 
Digitary  (Digital  Notary)  [10]:  the  system 
issues,  distributes  and  authenticates  eCertificates 
over  the  Internet  with  the  system  installed  to 
institutions individually.  Students need to login to 
their institution’s system to access and manage their 
eCertificates, such as set access tokens for individual 
reviewers.    Reviewers  can  then  access  the 
eCertificates  through  the  received  URLs  using  the 
access tokens; this may involve registration process 
depending on the access level that was set.  This is 
the  closest  system  to  our  idea  of  the  eCertificate, 
however,  it  uses  an  institutional  approach  when 
applying  digital  signing,  therefore,  there  exist  the 
storage,  security,  lifetime  validation,  and  usage 
issues mentioned above. 
 
4.4. Use cases analysis 
The  eCertificate  scenarios  have  been  set  up  to 
help  with the understanding  of the  situation.  It is 
depicted in Table 1 
 
 Table 1. Use Case Scenarios 
  Scenarios and conditions  
c
r
e
a
t
e
 
 
An exam board checks that the students have successfully 
passed the particular exams, and are who they claim to be, 
and then creates the e-certificates accordingly.  -- This 
involves identification and verification against the exam 
board’s database.  The creation process needs to have 
standard control for both low and high level qualification 
certificates in order to suit educational institutions of a wild 
range.   
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
 
  An exam board found out that an e-certificate was miss-
issued, and needs to be withdrawn.  -- This needs security 
methods to support the withdrawal mechanism 
i
s
s
u
e
 
The exam board issues the e-certificates for students.  -- This 
needs security methods to a) indicate that the e-certificates are 
issued by the exam board, in order to prove its genuineness, 
and prevent unauthorized editing and copying after issue; b) 
issue the e-certificates;  
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
  The students receive their e-certificates, and view the 
contents. -- This needs security methods to ensure that no one 
other than the students themselves can view their own e-
certificates.    
m
a
n
a
g
e
 
  A student specifies certain e-certificates to be visible to 
particular employers.  -- The student needs to be able to 
control which e-certificate(s) for which employer(s) and are 
for how long they would be valid.  The system design needs 
to be user friendly, suitable for users without IT skills  
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
 
 
A student sends the selected e-certificate(s)to potential 
employers  -- The student should be able to send the e-
certificate(s) alone or within an e-portfolio.  --  For students 
sending the e-certificates through e-portfolio accounts, only 
the selected e-certificate(s) in the account should be visible to 
the employer(s).  
r
e
v
i
e
w
 
  An employer views the received e-certificate(s)  -- This needs 
security methods to a) ensure only the specified employer can 
view the e-certificate(s), but not anyone else; b)  protect from 
modifying and unauthorized copying.  
v
e
r
i
f
y
 
 
The employer verifies the received e-certificate(s) -- The 
system need to be able to verify all level qualifications that 
are issued using the same standard from any education 
institutions nationwide, and check that the e-certificate and 
the key are still valid  
 
The scenarios are shown diagrammatically as use 
cases  in  Figure2.  The  use  cases  indicate  that  the 
eCertificate system involves many issues during the 
processes: 
Assertion: the system need to be self certificating 
to prove it’s genuine, and also to allow reviewers to 
further  confirm  it.    As  well  as  generating  these 
assertions, it should be possible to withdraw them.  
Parallels  can  be  drawn  with  Public  Key 
Infrastructure certificate systems, which provide the 
required method while also maintaining a revocation 
list  of  keys  which  are  invalid  as  they  have  been 
compromised[11].  
Privacy: ePortfolio reference models include the 
functionality for owners to be able to create different 
“views” where “information relevant to a particular 
purpose”  is  selected  by  the  owner  for  a  selected 
audience[12]. This means the owner can tailor their 
portfolio to best support their application. This also 
applies  to  eCertificates,  as  no  matter  whether  it  is 
used standalone or within an ePortfolio, one aim is to 
give students control over its usage  This is a similar 
paradigm to Web 2.0 social networking sites were a 
user can “categorize their network [of friends] into 
different  access  groups  with  different  access 
privileges”[13]. 
Rights: the learners have not only needs, but also 
rights.    They  have  the  ownership  of  their 
qualification  attainments,  same  as  paper-based 
certificates.  These are personal data, and the owners 
have  the  right  to  store,  manage,  share  and  track, 
“under their control, with their consent, and for their 
benefit”[14].  
Stakeholder  Trust:  A  fundamental  requirement 
from  the  use  cases  is  the  need  to  establish  trust 
amongst stakeholders.  Once more parallels can be 
drawn with PKI systems where trust networks have 
to be engineered in order for any other user to see 
value  in  the  key  certificates  generated.  This  is 
typically achieved either with a hierarchy of globally 
“trusted  nodes  called  Certificate  Authorities”  (CA) 
or by anarchy based methods such as Pretty Good 
Privacy  (PGP)  where  chains  of  trust  are  formed 
between users who already know each other[15]. 
Distributed  Stakeholders:  To  “stimulate  large-
scale uptake” of users[6], eCertificate tools need to 
define  “architecture  of  participation”.  The 
eCertificate  system  won’t  work  unless  there  is  a 
significant body of universities and employers who 
will accept them.  This concept is defined within the 
Web 2.0 community as the network effects that are 
achieved  when  “Users  Add  Value”  and  encourage 
further users to participate[16]. 
 
e-Certificate holder
create
e-Certificate receiver e-Certificate issuer
manage
distribute
view
verifiy
verify identity verify pass of exam
includes includes
gather information
digitally sign
includes
includes
secure issue
view
verify the  issuer
verifiy student's identity set access control
include
s
includes
includes
keep a record
issue distrubute
being awarded
verify
 
Figure 2. eCertificate use case diagram 
4.5. Gap analysis:  
Existing  services:  a)  Digital  signing:  digital 
signatures  are  used  in  e-documents  to  provide 
authentication,  integrity,  and  non-repudiation.    By 
adopting digital signing method, adding an issuer’s 
signature  to  an  eCertificate  can  meet  part  of  the 
eCertificate assertion use case as it can provide proof 
of  the  certificate’s  source  and  evidence  of 
modification, and it also meet part of the stakeholder 
trust  use case as the  CAs provide chain of trusted 
nodes.    b)  Service  Orientated  Architecture:  By adopting the SOA of the eFramework one meets the 
distributed  stakeholder  use  case  as  SOA  provides 
architecture of participation.  c) Federated Identity: 
The  formation  of  stakeholder  trust  has  been 
addressed  in  previous  eFramework  projects, 
including ePortfolio projects, by utilizing the open-
source  federated  identity  system  Shibboleth[7].  It 
would  provide  a  framework  for  eCertificate 
stakeholders  to  be  able  to  lookup  and  verify  the 
identities of other stakeholders; and therefore be able 
to  place  trust  in  their  identity.  However,  such 
systems  may  need  to  be  extended  in  order  to 
associate the requirements of eCertificate system. 
Required  Services:  Current  research is  missing 
services to certify the veracity of any XML structure; 
it isn’t possible to create eCertificates to assert that 
an  XML  fragment  representing  the  qualification  is 
genuine.  Therefore, services are required to address 
the  lifetime  validation,  trust  and  key  management, 
and privacy issues while solving the (eCertificate)
2 
problem. 
 
4.6. Bridging the profile gap 
Auto  verification  of  CRLs:  to  solve  the 
(certificate)
2  problem,  we  need  to  validate  the 
certificates’  state  against  two  types  of  certificate 
revocation list (CRL): whether the signer’s key has 
been  compromised  or  the  actual  content  certificate 
has been redrawn.  Therefore we need to maintain 
the document’s revocation list as well as the signer’s 
certificate revocation list (CRL).  We can provide a 
service to automatically verify the status against both 
of these lists, without the need of raise a request by 
the reviewers.   
XML  metadata:  the  ownership,  usage,  and 
privacy issues can be solved by generate the related 
information in XML metadata while employing the 
enveloped and enveloping signature method to create 
an eCertificate; allow the owner to set access control 
to the document while retaining the integrity of the 
digital signature. 
An independent system that provides verification 
service  would  be  an  ideal  to  solve  the  lifetime 
validation issue.  However, it needs to overcome the 
storage and security issues. 
 
4.7. Goals 
According  to  the  research  information  and 
analysis result, the eCert system designed is aim to: 
Maintain  information  privacy,  and  ensure  that  the 
owner  can  have  control  over  the  usage  of  their 
eCertificates;  Prevent  unauthorized  modifying,  and 
could  be  verified  in  a  legal  context;  Lifetime 
validation,  independent  from  issuing  body.    Allow 
for  verification  nationwide;  Easy  to  use  while 
maintain  security  controls,  suit  low  IT  skill  users, 
both  students  and  reviewers;  Can  be  accessed 
through  the  issuing  organizations,  or  any  owner 
preferred  ePortfolio,  or  be  used  as  a  standalone 
application. 
 
4.8. System design 
As  a  result,  the  eCert  system  was  designed  to 
contain  three  subsystems  for  issuing,  management, 
and verification services, showed in Figure3: 
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Figure 3. eCert system design flow diagram 
 
1.  The eCert issuing subsystem will create and issue 
eCertificates.  An eCertificate may contain three 
sections where applicable: an electronic version 
of the award qualification certificate; the transit 
file of the supported information about the 
qualification and the organization; and the skill 
assessment file that the certification was based 
on.  The eCertificate will be digitally signed and 
encrypted to ensure assertion and prevent 
unauthorized access; it will also contain build-in 
functions to allow usage control settings while 
maintain the integrity of the digital signing. 
2.  The eCert management subsystem will be access 
controlled.  It will enable the eCertificate owners 
to view and set control to their own eCertificates, 
e.g. who can see what (which sections) and for 
how long, and hence produce specific views for 
specified reviewers within specified time. 
3.  The eCert verification subsystem will take 
eCertificates and their co-responding access keys 
as input, using their decrypted data and build in 
functions to verify the state of the signers’ public 
key certificates and the award qualification 
certificates (whether they have been revolved); 
validate the award expire time and access expire 
time; verify the digital signature against content 
modification; and display the file when 
successfully pass all the above processes. 
The  eCert  issuing  subsystem  is  for  registered 
educational  organizations  only.    The  management 
subsystem  and  verification  subsystem  will  be provided through the eCert online central system.  In 
addition,  there  will  be  an  eCert  application  for  all 
stakeholders  to  download.    The  application  will 
provide the management and verification services as 
the  online  central  system.    Therefore,  the 
eCertificates  can  be  accessed  locally,  and  then 
automatically verified through the network.  This has 
benefit  of  avoiding  uploading  files,  it  would  be 
particular  useful  when  verify  a  large  number  of 
eCertificates is required.  
 
4.9. Advantages  
Compared with the other methods and approach 
which  mentioned  above,  the  eCert  system  offers 
huge advantages: 
Ownership:  the  eCert  system  is  designed  with 
user  centric  approach,  the  eCertificate  is  in  the 
owner’s hand, and the owner has full control of it.  
E.g. owner can set access control to an eCertificate, 
and  it  can  be  stored  to  the  owner’s  preferred 
repositories  while  still  maintaining  verification 
functions;  
Technical: the system contain functions to handle 
the (eCertificate)2 and the auto validation problems; 
also allowing setting for usage control  while could 
still  be  verified  against  the  initial  issuer’s  digital 
signature. 
Usage: provides a single access point, convenient 
access for learners and reviewers with eCertificates 
that have been issued from a wide range of register 
educational organizations; 
Lifetime  validation:  an  eCertificate  can  be 
verified  independently  without  referring  to  the 
issuing  institution,  the  central  system  provides  the 
required  services  for  any  issued  eCertificates  even 
when the issuing institution no longer exists.  
System  storage:  the  system  doesn’t  store  any 
eCertificates copies or sensitive data in the system, 
while providing all the required services through a 
secured  environment.    It  minimizing  the  required 
storage.  This becomes increasingly significant as the 
system grows in  size, especially  when its  usage is 
nationwide, and the eCertificates need to last for life 
Security: as our sensitive data are not stored in 
the system, and there is no traffic raised against any 
organisations’  database  due  to  the  verification 
process, we can avoid many of the potential attacks;  
Trust: the central system is only there to provide 
a service, as our sensitive data are not stored in the 
system, there will be no risk of our data being lost.  
Regarding  people  in  general,  who  don’t  trust 
government bodies to hold their personal data, this 
approach  makes  having  such  a  central  system 
possible.  
 
4.10.  Demo and workshop feedbacks 
The eCert project has been through the research, 
analysis,  design,  and  design  review  phases,  and  is 
now  at  the  end  of  the  demonstrator  development 
stage.   Positive feedbacks have been received from 
conferences  and  workshops  internationally.    Joe 
Wilson[17], one of the workshop participants, wrote 
on  his  blog:  “…  Some  really  useful  example  uses 
from  across  UK…  can  be  used  to  verify  exam 
results, project work, ePortfolios. … can see lots of 
applications  for  this.    Potentially  useful  links  to 
Bologna process and E-Certification E-pass work”. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
From the eCert challenge, a potential solution has 
been  successfully  proposed.  As  the  eCertificate 
problems  represent  the  situation  that  the  digital 
signing  issues  faced,  the  principle  of  the  eCert 
solution can be employed to solve the digital signing 
issues that applied in many other situations. 
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